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Abstract
A number of questions associated with practical implementations of quantum cryp-
tography systems having to do with unconditional secrecy, computational loads and
effective secrecy rates in the presence of perfect and imperfect sources are discussed.
The different types of unconditional secrecy, and their relationship to general com-
munications security, are discussed in the context of quantum cryptography. In order
to actually carry out a quantum cryptography protocol it is necessary that sufficient
computational resources be available to perform the various processing steps, such as
sifting, error correction, privacy amplification and authentication. We display the full
computer machine instruction requirements needed to support a practical quantum
cryptography implementation. We carry out a numerical comparison of system per-
formance characteristics for implementations that make use of either weak coherent
sources of light or perfect single photon sources, for eavesdroppers making individual
attacks on the quantum channel characterized by different levels of technological ca-
pability. We find that, while in some circumstances it is best to employ perfect single
photon sources, in other situations it is preferable to utilize weak coherent sources. In
either case the secrecy level of the final shared cipher is identical, with the relevant
distinguishing figure-of-merit being the effective throughput rate.
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1 Introduction
Recent progress in telecommunications and optoelectronics is making it possible for serious
consideration to be devoted to the prospect of practical quantum key distribution systems.
One possible use to which quantum key distribution may be put is as a precursor to the
real-time encryption of plaintext using the method of the Vernam cipher, or one-time pad.
Such an end-to-end secret system, which would offer the promise of undecipherable com-
munications, is attractive for a wide class of applications in spite of the fact that Vernam
encryption requires a cipher that is bit-for-bit as long as the plaintext. However, in order to
make progress in implementing real systems that will work in actual physical environments, it
is necessary to determine to what extent predictions regarding secrecy in ideal situations can
be realized with practical devices and components. To that end, in this paper we clarify the
important but often overlooked distinction between secrecy and security in communications.
This is a distinction with a difference, as it illuminates the proper constraints that must be
satisfied in order to achieve privacy in realistic communications scenarios. We then focus on
the specific types of secrecy that are relevant to quantum cryptogaphy, distinguishing be-
tween what may actually be achieved in practical implementations in physical environments
and what is restricted to formal discussions that are pertinent only to idealized models. We
point out that there are actually three “levels” of unconditional secrecy that one may discuss.
We provide a careful description of a particular implementation of sifting, error correction
and privacy amplification for three reasons: it is of intrinsic interest, it identifies the points at
which authentication is required to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks by an eavesdropper,
and it provides the necessary input for the detailed result we subsequently present on com-
putational loads. These are the requirements on classical computing machinery that must be
satisfied in order to actually carry out the quantum cryptographic transmission. Finally, we
consider practical implementations of quantum cryptography in which optical fiber is used
as the quantum channel and compare the use of perfect single photon sources with the use
of weak coherent sources, and we in particular consider this in distinct scenarios in which
the eavesdropping attacks are constrained to lesser and greater degrees. Based on this we
are able to identify situations in which it is preferable to use a perfect single photon source
instead of a weak coherent source, and vice versa.
2 Quantum Key Distribution Using the BB84 Protocol
Here we provide a very brief description of the basic elements of quantum key distribution.
We will illustrate this with the original four-state QKD protocol developed by Bennett and
Brassard in 1984 known as the “BB84” protocol [1]. For definiteness in this illustration we
will assume that individual photons serve as the quantum bits for the protocol, or more
precisely, the polarization states of individual photons. To carry out the protocol one of the
parties transmits a sequence of photons to the other party. The parties publicly agree to make
use of two distinct polarization bases which are chosen to be maximally non-orthogonal. In a
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completely random order, a sequence of photons are prepared in states of definite polarization
in one or the other of the two chosen bases and transmitted by one of the parties to the
other through a channel that preserves the polarization. The photons are measured by
the receiver in one or the other of the agreed upon bases, again chosen in a completely
random order. The choices of basis made by the transmitter and receiver thus comprise
two independent random sequences. Since they are independent random sequences of binary
numbers, about half of the basis choices will be the same and are called the “compatible”
bases, and the other half will be different and are called the “incompatible” bases. The two
parties compare publicly, making use for this purpose of a classical communications channel,
the two independent random sets of polarization bases that were used, without revealing the
polarization states that they observed. The bit values of those polarization states measured
in the compatible bases furnish the “sifted key.” Note that, if the two parties used classical
signals to send the key, an eavesdropper could simply measure the signals to obtain complete
knowledge of the key. If, on the other hand, the two parties use single photons to transmit
the key, the Heisenberg Indeterminacy Principle guarantees that an eavesdropper cannot
measure the polarizations without being detected. The sifted keys possessed by each of
the parties will in general be slightly different from each other due to errors caused by the
use of imperfect equipment. A classical error correction procedure, carried out through the
classical communication channel, is executed in order to produce identical, error-free keys at
both ends. It is possible that an enemy may have obtained some information about the key
during the publicly-discussed error correction phase of the protocol. In addition, it is also
possible for the enemy to have obtained information due to the presence in the sequence of
quantum bits of multiple photon states. The process of “privacy amplification” is therefore
applied to the sifted, error-free key. This has the effect of reducing the information available
to the enemy to an arbitrarily low value with extremely high probability.
3 Security and Secrecy
Much of the current research in quantum cryptography is devoted to the construction of
proofs of the “unconditional security” of quantum cryptographic protocols. The first such
proofs assumed idealized equipment [2, 3, 4, 5]. More recent investigations have explored the
consequences of the noise, errors, and losses that inevitably occur in a practical implementa-
tion [6, 7, 8]. Our concern here is to understand what, precisely, is meant by “unconditional
security”, to develop a nomenclature that is more consistent with established definitions,
and to point out the fundamental way in which quantum cryptographic security differs from
what is achievable with classical cryptographic techniques.
3
3.1 The Distinction between Communications Security and Cryp-
tographic Secrecy
First, we note that the distinction between “security” and “secrecy” is frequently glossed
over. Shannon’s original definition of the term “perfect secrecy” is found in his seminal work
on the subject: Communication Theory of Secrecy Systems (cf [9]). The basic requirement for
secrecy is that, in comparing the situation before the enemy has intercepted the transmission
with the situation after any such interception (and analysis) has occurred, the a posteriori
and a priori probabilities for the enemy to know the content of the transmission must be
identical. Under this definition, the transmission of a key K from the transmitter (Alice) to
the receiver (Bob) is perfectly secret when
I(K,X1) = I(K,X2) , (1)
where I denotes the mutual information, X1 is the data the eavesdropper (Eve) has obtained
prior to the execution of the key distribution protocol and X2 is the data she has after the
protocol. We see that the term “secrecy” applies solely to the protection provided by the
cryptographic protocol alone. The system taken as a whole may not be secure even though
the protocol is perfectly secret. This may happen in one of two ways. Either Eve has prior
knowledge of the key, so that I(K,X1) > 0, or Eve manages to add to her information the
key at some later time, thus obtaining a string X3 with I(K,X3) > 0. In either case, Eve
has obtained information without compromising the protocol itself.
The notion of “security” or, more precisely, communications security [10], is defined in a
broader context to which Shannon’s “perfect secrecy” is a contributing factor. According to
the standard scheme advocated by the U.S. National Security Agency in [11], communications
security is split into four separate categories:
(1) cryptosecurity - [The] component of communications security that results from the pro-
vision of technically sound cryptosystems (emphasis added) and their proper use.
(2) emission security - Protection resulting from all measures taken to deny unauthorized
persons information of value which might be derived from intercept and analysis of compro-
mising emanations from crypto-equipment, computer and telecommunications systems.
(3) physical security - [The] component of communications security that results from all
physical measures necessary to safeguard classified equipment, material, and documents
from access thereto or observation thereof by unauthorized persons.
(4) transmission security - [The] component of communications security that results from the
application of measures designed to protect transmissions from interception and exploitation
by means other than cryptanalysis.
In this paper we will use the word secrecy as synonymous with cryptosecurity, in the sense of
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definition (1) above, in recognition of the fact that the security of the entire cryptographic
system depends on several factors in addition.
Unconditional secrecy refers to secrecy that remains intact when the cryptosystem is sub-
jected to attacks by an enemy equipped with unlimited time and - within the constraints
dictated by the laws of physics - unlimited computing machinery. We therefore assume that
Eve has complete access to the specifications of the protocols used by Alice and Bob as
well as physical access to both the quantum and classical channels. Secrecy is assured by
fundamental restrictions of quantum mechanics. Note that unconditional secrecy is com-
pletely beyond the reach of classical cryptographic systems. Although Vernam encryption
is of course unbreakable without explicit knowledge of the key, there is no classical, purely
cryptographic method of distributing the key which provides perfect unconditional secrecy
(the use of a trustworthy courier, for instance, does not correspond to cryptographic secrecy,
but rather is an example of transmission security). With regard to classical cryptographic
protection applied to key distribution, if Eve has free access to the classical communications
channel and unlimited computing power, there is no way to guarantee an upper bound to the
information she is able to obtain. Such bounds can be obtained for quantum cryptographic
systems that rely on the distribution of Vernam keys over a quantum channel. Information
bounds resulting from proofs of secrecy fall into three categories. We will call these perfect
secrecy, asymptotic secrecy, and secrecy in the sense of privacy amplification.
3.2 Three Categories of Secrecy
In this section we describe the secrecy of quantum key distribution in terms of the mutual
information I(K,X) of the key K and a string containing the information Eve has obtained
X . Note that the uniformity of the key, that is, the uniformity of the probability distribution
of the key in the space of all possible keys, is also a requirement for successfully using the
key in Vernam encryption. In practice, both secrecy and uniformity can be established by
bounding Eve’s entropy:
H(K|X) ≥ L (K)− ǫ (2)
where L (K) is the length of the key string in bits. Given this bound on the entropy, we
have
I(K,X) ≡ H(K)−H(K|X) ≤ L (K)−H(K|X) ≤ ǫ (3)
which establishes the secrecy bound and
H(K) = I(K,X) +H(K|X) ≥ H(K|X) ≥ L (K)− ǫ (4)
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which establishes uniformity of the key in the space of binary strings of length L (K). In this
paper we will restrict our attention to the secrecy of the key, with the implicit understanding
that the corresponding statements of uniformity also apply.
3.2.1 Perfect secrecy
Proofs of perfect secrecy often proceed by assuming that Eve has no initial knowledge of the
key, so that I(K,X1) = 0, and then attempting to show that I(K,X2) = 0. It should be
noted that, in view of the distinction between secrecy and security as clarified in Section
3.1 above, such an approach, although common, is not completely general. Instead, one
should proceed by not assuming anything about the specific amount of information that Eve
may have previously obtained. Thus, a proof of perfect secrecy should begin merely with
the assumption that Eve has some amount of a priori knowledge of the key, say an amount
Iˆ which may be zero or greater than zero, so that I(K,X1) = Iˆ. (Of course, if Iˆ > 0
then there has been some non-cryptographic violation of the security of the communication
system, arising from failure to observe proper “technically sound cryptosystem design and
practice,” as discussed in [8]. The communications system in this case is already insecure,
even though the cryptographic protocol that it employs may be provably secret.) A proof of
perfect secrecy then consists in showing that I(K,X2) = Iˆ as well, so that
I(K,X2)− I(K,X1) ≡ ∆I = 0 . (5)
Unconditional perfect secrecy consists in further demonstrating that ∆I = 0 in the absence
of any assumptions about the computational resources and capabilities of Eve. This more
general approach includes as a special case those proofs which rely on the restrictive initial
assumption that I(K,X1) = 0. The point here is that one may indeed demonstrate that a
cryptographic protocol (in this case, key distribution) is perfectly secret, i.e. ∆I = 0, and even
show that it is unconditionally perfectly secret, i.e. ∆I = 0 with no assumed conditions,
and at the same time have the actual communications be entirely insecure. However, all
this is moot since, in any event, perfect unconditional secrecy (i.e., having ∆I = 0 hold
exactly) is not achievable for any cryptographic protocol in which strings of finite length are
transmitted, even for perfect quantum systems (i.e., systems utilizing perfect singlet state
quantum bits), since there is a finite non-vanishing probability that Eve can eavesdrop on
the quantum channel without introducing errors, thus gaining information without being
detected.
3.2.2 Asymptotic secrecy
In practice, the mutual information is not strictly zero, but is bounded by a quantity that is
exponentially small. For the case of asymptotic secrecy , the bound is of the form (for brevity
here and in Section 3.2.3 we now do assume that I(K,X1) = 0)
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I(K,X2) ≤ 2−O(Ns) , (6)
where the exponent is of the order of the size in bits of the resulting key, Ns, and the
inequality holds with probability close to 1.
For practical purposes there is little difference between asymptotic and perfect secrecy, since
the exponential quantity that bounds I(K,X2) is extremely small. Note that in the limit
of an infinitely long cipher we have limNs→∞ 2
−O(Ns) = 0 and we recover perfect secrecy as
defined above (here in the special case I(K,X1) = 0).
3.2.3 Secrecy in the sense of privacy amplification
Discussions of the secrecy of practical implementations of quantum cryptography [6, 7, 8]
typically establish secrecy in the sense of privacy amplification. This is because information
leaked to Eve during error correction and other phases of the protocol is removed by a privacy
amplification protocol [12]. This results in a bound of the form
〈I(K,X2)〉 < 2−gpa , (7)
where the angle brackets indicate an expectation value over the class of hash functions used
to carry out privacy amplification, and where gpa is a security parameter determined by the
protocol, independent of the size of the string, Ns. The price we pay for this is a shortening
of the string by a number of bits equal to the upper bound on Eve’s mutual information
prior to privacy amplification plus the security parameter gpa.
Privacy amplification was first applied to the problem of quantum cryptography by Bennett
et al. [1]. Closely allied techniques are used in security proofs by Mayers [2] and by Biham et
al. [4] which treat quantum key distribution systems using idealized single photon sources,
but which allow Eve to make any possible quantum mechanical attack. Gilbert and Hamrick
[8] apply privacy amplification to practical systems using realistic photon sources subject to
“individual” attacks, in which Eve attacks each photon independently of the others.
Secrecy in the sense of privacy amplification is different from asymptotic secrecy in three
important respects. First, there is no necessary relationship between the security parameter
gpa and the size of the key, Ns. Second, and corollary to the first difference, secrecy in the
sense of privacy amplification does not necessarily become perfect secrecy in the limit of
large keys. (This would happen if gpa were arbitrarily chosen to be some fraction of the key
size. Since gpa bits are removed from the string by privacy amplification, this approach is
costly in terms of the rate of generation of key material. Note that bounds of this form
are in fact obtained by Biham et al. [4].) Third, we improve the secrecy bound in privacy
amplification by increasing gpa, thus producing a shorter key. In contrast, we improve the
secrecy bound of an asymptotically secret string simply by constructing a longer key.
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Finally, note that the asymptotic secrecy bound is expressed as an absolute bound on the
mutual information, while the secrecy bound for privacy amplification is given as an average
over the set of hash functions. This is really an artificial distinction, since absolute bounds
can be derived for the privacy amplification result as well [13, 14].
There is no qualitative distinction between the secrecy achieved by systems using pure single
photon sources and that achieved by systems whose sources generate a mixture of single-
photon and multi-photon pulses. In both cases information will be leaked to Eve at some
point in the protocol, and any protocol that removes the leaked information by classical
privacy amplification falls into the category of secrecy in the sense of privacy amplification.
We shall return to this point later.
It must be emphasized that the distinction between security and secrecy is not merely a mat-
ter of semantics, but has a definite impact on what is required in order to obtain proofs of
unconditional secrecy. In particular, unconditional proofs of secrecy need not be concerned
with eavesdropping attacks that compromise the physical security of the cryptographic sys-
tem. As an example, attacks in which Eve manipulates the efficiency of Bob’s detection
device have been discussed in the literature [15]. This manipulation might be achieved by
modifying the wavelength of the pulses received by Bob, in which case the attack can be
countered by inserting a narrowband filter in the optical path. Otherwise the attack would
require direct access to Bob’s detection devices, which is a breach not of cryptosecurity but
of physical security. Note also that, given such access to Bob’s physical installation, Eve
could compromise the security of the entire system much more easily by using other parts
of Bob’s equipment, notably the mass storage where the secret key material is kept prior to
use. Such attacks are clearly beyond the scope of what is required for proofs of unconditional
secrecy.
4 Error Correction, Authentication, Privacy Amplifi-
cation and Computational Loads
The BB84 protocol is really of family of protocols that can be implemented in many different
ways. The details of the quantum transmissions depend on the way Alice and Bob choose
to represent qubits, e.g. by choosing to use photons or electrons, and by the quantum basis
states they pick to encode the information. Similarly the classical transmissions used to
identify basis choices, correct errors, and authenticate the communications channels can be
implemented in a variety of ways. This section describes details of a specific implementa-
tion to give an idea of the kind of classical communications and computational algorithms
that are required. See reference [8] for a more detailed analysis of the computational and
communications resources required to carry out this implementation of BB84.
The complete implementation of the protocol occurs in three phases. The first phase is the
production of a sifted string of bits shared, except for some errors, by Alice and Bob. This is
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achieved by applying the BB84 protocol previously described. If the equipment were perfect
and there were no possibility of errors, the sifted strings would be identical and any errors
would be due to an attempt by Eve to measure the polarizations of the photons. Since real
equipment is never perfect, it is essential to include mechanisms to correct the errors due
to the equipment and to eliminate information leaked to Eve in the process. The second
phase is thus error correction. Alice and Bob agree on a systematic protocol to identify and
correct the errors. Since Eve can eavesdrop on this discussion, some additional amount of
key information is leaked to her at this time. The third phase is privacy amplification, during
which Alice and Bob apply a hash transformation to the error-corrected string. This results
in a shorter string about which Eve’s expected information is vanishingly small. At various
points during these three phases, Alice and Bob must authenticate their communications to
ensure that Eve is not making a man-in-the-middle attack.
In addition, Alice and Bob check that the observed error rate is below a threshold value. The
information that Eve can obtain by directly measuring single photon pulses is bounded by
the error rate on the channel, and the protocol uses privacy amplification to protect against
information losses up to that bound. By testing the error rate, Alice and Bob can detect any
attempt by Eve to obtain additional information by a stronger direct-measurement attack
on the quantum channel.
4.1 Sifting
The first phase of the key distribution protocol is the generation of an initial sifted string that
is shared between Alice and Bob, but which may contain errors and about which Eve may
have partial information. We describe here a specific implementation of the sifting protocol.
Alice generates two blocks of m random bits. The first block is the raw key material, and the
second block determines the choice of basis she uses to transmit the bits over the quantum
channel. Bob generates a single block of m bits that reflect his choice of basis in measuring
the incoming qubits. Bob must now identify to Alice those pulses for which he detected
a qubit and inform her of his choice of basis for those pulses. Bob has several choices
available in deciding how he wants to encode this information. For purposes of estimating
the computational load it is necessary to choose a specific implementation. Accordingly, we
choose an implementation in which Bob sends to Alice two pieces of information for each
photon he detects. The first piece indicates which of the m bits sent by Alice resulted in the
detected photon, and the second gives Bob’s choice of basis for that photon. This requires
that Bob send 2n (1 + log2m) bits for each block of key material. (The factor of 2 arises
from the fact that Bob measures about one half of the qubits in the wrong basis. These
qubits are discarded to produce the sifted string. Since the sifted string is of length n, the
number of qubits detected by Bob is 2n.)
Once Alice has received Bob’s information, she compares Bob’s basis choices with her own
and informs Bob of the results. Alice can accomplish this by sending Bob a single bit corre-
sponding to each of the photons Bob detected, resulting in a total of 2n bits of information
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sent to Bob.
4.2 The Need for Authentication during Sifting
We must now augment the protocol with provisions that will prevent Eve from making the
so called man-in-the-middle attack. In this attack, Eve interposes herself between Alice
and Bob, measuring Alice’s pulses on the quantum channel as though she were Bob, and
generates a distinct set of pulses to send to Bob as though she were Alice. In all her
subsequent correspondence with Alice over the classical channel, she responds just as Bob
would, and in all correspondence with Bob she plays the role of Alice. After the first phase
of the protocol, Eve has two blocks of sifted keys, one of which she shares with Alice and
the other with Bob. Assuming she can continue this attack through the error correction and
privacy amplification phases, she will have completely compromised Alice and Bob’s ability
to use the keys to transmit secret information. At this point Eve is able to decipher any
encrypted information sent between Alice and Bob, always passing the re-encrypted text to
the intended recipient so that neither Alice nor Bob is any the wiser.
In order to prevent this state of affairs, it is necessary to provide an authentication mechanism
to guarantee that the transmissions received by Bob were sent by Alice, and not by Eve,
and to guarantee that the transmissions received by Alice were sent by Bob. Wegman and
Carter [16] describe an authentication technique based on “almost universal2” sets of hash
functions that are well suited to this problem. The authentication works as follows. Alice
and Bob first agree upon a suitable space of hash functions to be used for authentication. All
details of their agreement may be revealed to Eve without compromising the authentication.
For each message that is to be authenticated, Alice picks a hash function from the space that
is known to Bob, but not to Eve. She does this by using a string of secret bits that is known
only to herself and Bob as an index to select the hash function. She uses some of the secret
key generated by previous iterations of the protocol to provide this secret index, with the
result that some of the key material is sacrificed in order to achieve authentication. She then
applies the hash function to the block of raw data to produce an authentication key. This
authentication key is transmitted to Bob along with the message. Bob uses the same string
of secret bits to pick the same hash function, applies it to the message, and compares the
result with the authentication key sent by Alice. If they match, Bob concludes that Alice,
and not Eve was, the sender of the message. Wegman and Carter describe a class of hash
functions such that the probability that Eve can generate the correct authentication key
without knowing the index used is vanishingly small. Let M1 denote the precondition that
Eve has obtained a copy of the message to be authenticated and T (E)1 denote the outcomes
in which Eve guesses the tag for the message. The probability of such an outcome is
P(T (E)1 |M1) = 2−gauth , (8)
where gauth depends on the space of hash functions Alice and Bob have chosen to use for the
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protocol. It can be made as large as desired by making the space sufficiently large. Alice
and Bob do pay a price for increased confidence. A larger space of functions requires a
larger set of indices, and thus a longer string of secret bits must be sacrificed to perform the
authentication. The other restriction on the protocol is that a new hash function, and thus
a new index, must be used for each message to be authenticated if we desire to maintain
this upper bound on Eve’s ability to spoof the authentication process. If we allow Eve to
obtain one prior message and tag, denoted as M1T1, and then allow her to obtain the next
message, denoted as M2, as well as the information that Alice and Bob intend to use the
same hash function for both, her chances of guessing the second tag improve only slightly to
P(T (E)2 |M1T1M2) = 21−gauth . (9)
If we allow additional messages to be authenticated using the same hash function, Wegman
and Carter’s analysis provides no upper bound on Eve’s ability to produce a correct au-
thentication tag. Although it would be more efficient to allow the same hash function to
be applied exactly twice, we will consider the simpler case in which a new hash function is
picked for each message.
Before we consider which transmissions require authentication, it is important to realize that
any man-in-the-middle attack that results in differences between Bob’s and Alice’s strings of
key material can be detected by an equivalence check following error correction. Alice and
Bob perform the equivalence check by applying the same authentication hash function to
each of their strings and comparing the result. If the results match, they conclude that the
strings are identical with a high probability. This check is discussed in more detail in the
next section. For the purposes of discussing authentication and sifting, it is sufficient that
we require Alice and Bob to perform the equivalence check as a part of the protocol.
The transmissions on the quantum channel do not require authentication, since a man-in-the-
middle attack by Eve on the quantum channel will become evident when the error correction
process reveals that there is no correlation between Alice’s and Bob’s sifted strings. (Note
that the strings would also fail the equivalence check.)
It is not strictly necessary for Alice and Bob to authenticate the classical messages they
exchange during sifting, since the equivalence check will eventually detect a man-in-the-
middle attack on the sifting protocol. Nevertheless it is advantageous for Alice and Bob to
authenticate these messages. Note that Eve can compromise the secrecy of the final key by a
man-in-the-middle attack only if she makes the attack both on the quantum transmission and
on the classical messages used for sifting. An attack on the classical messages alone results
only in a “denial-of-service” attack, that is, an attack that makes it difficult or impossible
for Alice and Bob to complete the protocol successfully, but that does not compromise the
secrecy of the key material. Authentication of sifting renders these attacks ineffective early
in the protocol and thus localizes the attack to the quantum transmission and sifting phases
of the protocol. This is useful for Alice and Bob to know in formulating a response to the
attack. Authentication guarantees Alice and Bob that they are working with the same subset
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of the pulses sent by Alice and that any remaining errors are due to physical imperfections
of the equipment or attempts by Eve to measure, and therefore disturb, the pulses sent by
Alice. Any further interference by Eve is restricted to denial-of-service attacks during error
correction.
The authentication of the classical discussion results in a cost to the overall rate of quantum
key generation, since some of the secret bits produced by previous iterations of the protocol
must be sacrificed to generate an authentication tag that Alice or Bob can validate but that
Eve cannot forge. Wegman and Carter [16] show that the size of the secret index required
to select a hashing function is
w (g, c) = 4 (g + log2 log2 c) log2 c (10)
where c is the length in bits of the message to be authenticated and g is the length in bits of
the authentication tag. The full and complete expression for the quantity that we denote by
w and refer to as the Wegman-Carter function, which is of crucial importance in practical
quantum cryptography, does not appear to have been properly analyzed previously in the
context of QC (nor apparently even named by any authors). Surprisingly, the closed-form
function, as such, doesn’t appear as a numbered equation in [16]. In fact, it must be obtained
instead by combining quantities that appear in lines 3 and 17 in the first paragraph of section
3 in [16]. See [8] for a complete discussion of the cost of authentication and its effect on the
secrecy capacity of the quantum key distribution system.
4.3 Error Correction Phase
At this point Bob and Alice move on to the error correction phase. We will estimate the
authentication, communication, and computational costs for a modified version of the error
correction protocol described by Bennett et. al., [17]. More efficient techniques have been
developed, for example the “Shell” and “Cascade” protocols described in [18], but the method
described here is more suitable for our purposes since it is simpler to analyze.
At the beginning of the error correction phase, Alice and Bob each have a string of n bits.
The strings are expected to be nearly identical, but they will also contain errors for which
Alice and Bob disagree on the value of the bit. It is the goal of error correction to identify
and remove all of these errors, so that Alice and Bob can proceed with a high degree of
certainty that the strings are identical. Error correction consists of three steps. The first
step is the error detection and correction step, which eliminates all or almost all of the
errors. The validation step which follows eliminates any residual errors and iteratively tests
randomly chosen subsets of the string to generate a high degree of confidence that the strings
are identical. The final step is authentication, which protects against a man-in-the-middle
attack by Eve during the error correction process.
At the beginning of the error detection and correction step, Alice and Bob each shuffle the
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bits in their string using a random shuffle upon which they have previously agreed. The
purpose of this shuffle is to separate bursts of errors so that the errors in the shuffled string
are uniformly distributed. Alice and Bob may use the same shuffle each time they process a
new string of sifted bits, and security is not compromised if Eve has complete prior knowledge
of the shuffling algorithm, even including any random numbers used as parameters.
The error detection and correction step is an iterative process. Alice and Bob begin each
iteration i by breaking their strings into shorter blocks. The block length is chosen so that
the expected number of errors in each block is given by a parameter ̺. This is achieved by
breaking the string into J (i) blocks for the ith iteration, where
J (i) =
⌈
e
(i−1)
T
̺
⌉
, (11)
and e
(i)
T is the expected number of errors remaining after the i
th iteration or at the beginning
of the i+1st iteration. In principle the parameter ̺ could change from iteration to iteration.
We assume that it is a constant to simplify the analysis. Alice and Bob compute the parity
of each of the blocks and exchange their results. Blocks for which the parities do not match
necessarily contain at least one error. For each of the blocks in which Alice and Bob have
detected an error, they isolate the erroneous bit by a bisective search, which proceeds as
follows. Alice and Bob bisect one of the blocks containing an error, that is, they divide it as
evenly as possible into 2 smaller blocks. Alice and Bob each pick one of the smaller blocks
for the next parity check. For definiteness, assume they pick the block that lies closer to
the beginning of the shuffled string, which we will call the “lower” block. The other block
is then the “upper” block. Alice and Bob then compute the parity of the lower block and
compare their results. If the parities do not match, the error is in the lower block. If they
do match, the error is in the upper block. Alice and Bob then bisect the block that contains
the error and proceed recursively until they find an erroneous bit. Bob then inverts that bit
in his string, and thus the error is removed.
We have described the bisective search as though the search were completed for any block
containing a detected error before beginning the bisection on the next block. In fact, it is
more efficient from a communications standpoint to apply each bisection to all the blocks
with detected errors at the same time, exchange parities for all of the sub-blocks, and then
to proceed recursively to the next bisection. This results in fewer, but larger, packets of data
for each exchange between Bob and Alice, thus reducing the overall frame overhead.
When the bisective search is completed for all blocks in which an error is detected, a new
blocksize is computed based on the expected number of errors remaining, the string is broken
up into a new set of larger blocks, parity checks are compared for the blocks, and bisective
searches are made in those blocks containing detected errors. This process is repeated until
there would be only one or two blocks in the string for the next iteration, that is, until
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J (N1+1) ≤ 2 , (12)
where N1 is the number of iterations in the error correction and detection step.
In this version of the algorithm, the bits are not shuffled between successive iterations of
the error detection and correction step. There is some value in performing the shuffle, since
it separates pairs of errors that may survive previous iterations, thus making it more likely
that they are found before the validation step. However, this step is not essential and has
not been included in the estimate of computational loads to follow.
The second step in the error correction phase, validation, is also iterative. During each
iteration, Alice and Bob select the same random subset of their blocks. They compute the
parities and exchange them. If the parities do not match, Alice and Bob execute a bisective
search to find and eliminate the error. Iterations continue until N2 consecutive matching
parities are found. At this point, Alice and Bob conclude that their strings are error free.
The last step in the error correction phase is authentication. Up until now, Alice and Bob
have made no attempt to authenticate their exchange of parity information on the classical
channel. Eve could mount a man-in-the-middle attack during the error correction phase that
would fool Alice and Bob into correcting the wrong set of bits. This would not give Eve any
additional information about the secret string, but it could result in Alice and Bob believing
that their strings are identical when in fact they are not. Even if one bit is different, the
privacy amplification phase will produce strings that are completely uncorrelated, and Alice
and Bob will still believe that their strings are identical. The solution to this problem is for
Alice and Bob to verify that their strings are the same at the end of the error correction phase.
This effectively authenticates their prior communications, since any successful attempt by
Eve to steer the error correction process will be immediately apparent.
This approach presupposes that Alice and Bob can verify that their strings are the same
without leaking too much additional information to Eve. This can be accomplished if Alice
and Bob apply the same hash function to their strings and compare the resulting tag. This
does not provide an absolute guarantee that the strings are the same, but if the hash function
is chosen as described in [16], the probability that two different strings will yield the same
tag is
P (same tag, two strings) = 2−gEC , (13)
where gEC is the length of the tag. This gives a high degree of confidence that the strings
are identical even for relatively short (gEC ∼ 30) tags. The price Alice and Bob have to pay
for this is that they must use a portion of the secret bits obtained from previous iterations of
the protocol to select the hash function, indicate whether the keys match, and authenticate
their transmissions.
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4.4 Privacy Amplification Phase
The general scheme of privacy amplification is described in [12] and [19] . The hash functions
map a sifted, error corrected string of length n to a string of length Lpa, where
Lpa ≡ n− e(0)T − q − t− ν − gpa , (14)
where n is the length of the sifted string, e
(0)
T is the number of errors removed during error
correction, q is the additional information leaked during error correction, t is the amount
of information Eve obtains by attacks on single photon pulses, and ν is the amount of
information she obtains by attacks on multi-photon pulses. The resulting string is thus
shorter than the sifted string by the number of bits that Eve may have obtained by listening
to the classical discussion, plus an additional security parameter gpa. As shown in [12], this
parameter determines an upper bound on the expected amount of information, I, that Eve
can retain following privacy amplification:
〈I(K˜,X)〉 ≤ 2
−gpa
ln 2
, (15)
where K˜ is the key after privacy amplification and X is the information Eve has obtained
from all phases of the protocol. The expectation value is over the set of functions from which
Alice and Bob choose their hash function. See [13, 14] for a discussion of secrecy bounds
that are not conditioned on an average over the hash functions.
Hash functions appropriate for privacy amplification are described by Carter and Wegman
[19]. The class of hash functions used for authentication and equivalence checking is not
practical for privacy amplification due to the much larger size of the output string. The
authentication hash functions are designed to produce output strings that are no more than
half as long as the input string. Since we wish to retain as much information as possible, it is
clearly advantageous to use hash functions that can produce an output string that is nearly
as long as the input string. Furthermore, recall that the length of the index for choosing an
authentication hash function is [16, 8]
w (g, c) = 4 (g + log2 log2 c) log2 c (16)
where c and g are the lengths of the input and output strings, respectively. For purposes
of authentication and error correction, an output string of length g ≤ 50 is adequate, and
the length of the index is relatively short even for long input strings due to the logarithmic
factors. In privacy amplification, where the output string is nearly as long as the input
string, this index is roughly 4 times as long as the string to be hashed. In contrast, the hash
functions suitable for privacy amplification are described by two parameters, each as long as
the input string, so that the total size of the index is only twice as long as the input string.
The Carter-Wegman functions described in [19] are therefore a much better choice for privacy
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amplification since they are capable of producing keys nearly as long as the input and since
they require shorter indices for their definition than do the Wegman-Carter functions given
the large size of the output strings.
The error correction phase guarantees that the strings Alice and Bob have obtained are
identical with high probability. Bob and Alice implement privacy amplification by agreeing
on an index and applying the hash functions separately to their strings. The resulting strings
are identical and secret in the sense of privacy amplification (cf eq.(15)). Note that the sifting
protocol itself supplies random strings of sufficient length to define the required hash index.
Bob’s choice of basis for the 2n pulses he receives is one such source. Another alternative is
to compute the parities of the indices Bob sends to Alice by which he identifies which pulses
were detected by his equipment.
4.5 Computational Load
The total computational load implied by the protocols described here is analyzed in detail in
[8]. The result of the analysis is an approximate upper bound on the number of instructions
per block of key material:
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LB ≤ L(0)B
+
(
50 +
220
gauth
)
n (1 + log2m)
+
[
200 + 25N1 + 12.5
(
1− e−2̺
)
N1 + 25̺+ 37.5
(
N
(n)
2 +N
(f)
2
)
+
43
w
+
220
gauth
+
110
gEC
]
n
+
46
w2
n2 . (17)
In this expression, L(0)B is the “non-iterative” portion of the load, representing code that
executes once for each block of data without iterating bit-by-bit through the string of key
material. m is the block size in bits of the raw key material sent by Alice to Bob over the
quantum channel. n is the block size of the sifted key material. gauth and gEC are the security
parameters for authentication and error correction, respectively. ̺ is the parameter that
determines the blocksizes used in successive iterations of the first step of error correction. N1
is the number of iterations required in the first step of error correction. The term N
(n)
2 +N
(f)
2
is the total number of iterations in the second step of error correction. Expressions for these
iteration counts in terms of more fundamental parameters are found in [8]. Finally, w is the
wordsize in bits of the processing element that performs elementary integer arithmetic.
It is instructive to evaluate this expression for a practical example. Assume a substantial
non-iterative contribution:
L(0)B = 106 operations per block , (18)
and take the wordsize of the processor to be 64 bits. The other parameters are chosen to
have reasonable operational values and to give a reasonable value for the computation rate
as computed below (m = 2 × 108 bits, n = 2 × 105 bits, e(0)T = 2 × 103 bits, ̺ = 0.5,
gEC = gauth = N2 = 30). The resulting estimate of the load is 1.1 billion operations per
block. The quadratic term contributes 450 million operations to the total. Of the other
terms, the dominant contributions are the term in in N
(n)
2 + N
(f)
2 , which is due to parity
checks and random block extractions during the validation step of error correction, and the
term in (1 + log2m), which is due to sifting. Note that the non-iterative overhead load
is negligible in comparison with the other contributions. This indicates that a substantial
amount of “bookkeeping” code can be included along with the core software that is essential
to arriving at the final secret key without significantly affecting the processing requirements.
One of the uses of eq.(17) is to establish a load budget for such code during software design
and implementation to ensure that the bulk of the processing resources are available for the
core software functions.
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The computation rate RcompB required to support key distribution is found by dividing the
load per block by the time required to transmit one block over the quantum channel:
RcompB =
LB
mτ
, (19)
where m is the raw block size, and τ is the bit cell period for sending each bit. Note that the
processing load is quadratic in the sifted block size, so that the computation rate increases
roughly linearly with the block size. This means that the computations required for the full
protocol imply upper bounds on the sifted block size n and, by extension, the raw block size
m in order to keep the computational load within the capabilities of the equipment.
In order to obtain a quantitative result for the computational rate, we must choose a value for
τ , which is the inverse of the pulse repetition frequency of the photon source. Experimental
demonstrations of quantum key distribution have used attenuated lasers with pulse rates up
to 1 MHz [20], and photon transmission and detection has been demonstrated at 400 MHz
[21]. As discussed in [8], the limiting physical factors include the switching speed of the
optical equipment and the time required for the single photon detectors to reset for the next
pulse. A rate of 10 GHz is feasible with high quality optoelectronics, but current photon
detectors are much too slow to support this. It is possible that new technologies [22] will
enable single photon detectors to support these rates. We will accordingly set τ = 10−10 sec.
The computation rate for our example is then
RcompB = 56 billion operations/sec . (20)
This is rather high for a single general purpose processor, but should be achievable in a
parallel architecture in which each block of the input data is allocated to a single processor
as it becomes available. Recall also that general purpose computers are far from optimal for
this type of operation. Most of the processing steps involving the packing and unpacking
of the bits would not be necessary in a special purpose device, and many of the other
processing steps, notably block parity computations and random selection of substrings,
could be accomplished much more efficiently using special purpose hardware. In any case, it
should be clear that computational power is not a limitation on the practicality of quantum
cryptography even at very high rates of operation.
5 Effective Secrecy Capacity and Rate of Key Gener-
ation
In this section we apply the analysis key generation rate analysis of [8] to the consideration of
system performance characteristics in representative practical implementations of quantum
cryptography for which optical fiber is used as the quantum channel. In particular we wish
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to compare the use of perfect single photon sources with the use of weak coherent sources,
and we consider this in distinct scenarios in which the eavesdropping attacks are constrained
to lesser and greater degrees.
The motivation for this discussion is the common misconception that pure single photon
sources inherently provide a higher degree of secrecy than do sources with some admixture
of multi-photon pulses. This misconception arises from the following argument. If Eve
measures single photon states, she necessarily introduces a disturbance that can be detected
by Alice and Bob. The secrecy of the key is thus protected by the laws of quantum mechanics.
However, if some of the pulses encoding the key contain multiple photons, Eve can measure
a fraction of the photons in any given multi-photon pulse without disturbing the rest, thus
obtaining information without being detected. This appears to circumvent the guarantee
of secrecy for single photon sources. The need to carry out privacy amplification, however,
applies whether the protocol is implemented with a pure single photon source or with a
source that produces both single and multiple photon pulses. Even if there are no multi-
photon pulses at all amongst the signals sent from Alice to Bob, the fact that the physical
hardware generates errors, combined with the fact that Eve may be present, results in the
need for privacy amplification. Precisely the same degree of secrecy is realized whether the
protocol is implemented with pulsed lasers generating weak coherent pulses or with single
photon sources. The chief difference is the rate of generation of key material. In principle
the rates achievable with single photon sources should be higher, all other things being
equal, since Eve cannot gain information from attacks on multi-photon pulses in this case.
In reality, none of the single photon sources now in existence can produce pulses at a rate
comparable with currently available pulsed lasers. In this section we show that the key
generation rates are much higher for weak coherent sources (i.e. for sources producing some
fraction of multi-photon pulses) than for single photon sources for implementations that are
likely to be feasible in the near future.
We first summarize the results of [8] for key generation rates achieved with weak coherent
sources. We next present results suitably modified for ideal single photon sources. Following
[8], we consider only individual attacks, that is, attacks in which Eve attempts to obtain
information by making measurements of individual photons. The case of a more general
quantum attack, in which Eve may entangle probes with arbitrarily chosen groups of photons
is a subject for a subsequent analysis.
5.1 Definitions
We define the secrecy capacity S as the ratio of the length of the final key to the length of
the original string of pulses sent from Alice to Bob over the quantum channel:
S = L
m
. (21)
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This quantity is useful for two reasons. First, it can be used in proving the secrecy of specific
practical quantum cryptographic protocols by establishing that the inequality
S > 0 (22)
holds for the protocol. Second, it can be used to establish the rate of generation of key
material according to
R = S
τ
, (23)
where τ is the pulse period of the initial sequence of photon transmissions. We refer to R
as the effective secrecy rate.
The length of the final key is given by
L = n− (eT + q + t+ ν)− (a + gpa) , (24)
which is the same as the length of the key after privacy amplification (cf eq.(14)) except
that an additional amount a has been subtracted to account for the secret bits required for
authentication during the next iteration of the protocol. Recall that n is the length of the
sifted string, eT ≡ e(0)T is the number of errors removed during error correction, q is the
additional information leaked during error correction, t is the amount of information Eve
obtains by attacks on single photon pulses, and ν is the amount of information she obtains
by attacks on multi-photon pulses. See [8, 23] for a detailed quantitative treatment of the
terms appearing in this result. We apply this analysis to a number of scenarios involving
key distribution system operating over a fiber optic quantum channel in section 5.2.
5.2 Effective Secrecy Rates
There is extensive research activity [24, 25, 26, 27, 28] currently taking place devoted to the
development of sources of single photons to serve as quantum bits in various applications,
including in quantum cryptography. At the present time, though, there are no robust, perfect
sources of single photons available that can be used for practical quantum cryptography
purposes. At the same time a number of groups have carried out demonstrations of quantum
key distribution in which filtered, pulsed lasers are used as the source of the quantum bits.
The use of such weak coherent sources results in the production of both single-photon pulses
and multiple-photon pulses in the transmission stream from Alice to Bob. The presence of
multi-photon pulses allows Eve to execute a set of attacks that may (depending on precisely
how Bob monitors his photon detector) require a significant amount of privacy amplification
compression in order to assure secrecy, resulting in a considerably reduced throughput rate.
However, under the conditions described in Section 3 above, privacy amplification is also
required in any practical implementation even if we utilize a perfect single photon source.
Thus with the use of either type of source we see that the final, shared key is characterized
by unconditional secrecy in the sense of privacy amplification (cf eq.(7)). Then there is no
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secrecy advantage that inures to the use of a single photon source, and the only figure-of-
merit that distinguishes between the use of a single photon source (SPS) and a weak coherent
source (WCS) is the effective secrecy rate.
To analyze and compare the effective secrecy rates due to single photon sources and weak
coherent sources we must employ the appropriate expression for the number of sifted bits
shared between Alice and Bob in each case. This is given for a WCS by [8]
nWCS =
m
2
[
(1− rd)ψ≥1 (ηµα) + rd
]
≃ m
2
[
ψ≥1 (ηµα) + rd
]
, (25)
where µ is the average number of photons per pulse, η is the efficiency of Bob’s detector, α is
the transmission probability in the quantum channel, and rd is the probability of obtaining
a dark count in Bob’s detector during a single pulse period. ψ≥1 (X) is the probability of
encountering 1 or more photons in a pulse selected at random from a stream of Poisson
pulses having a mean of X photons per pulse:
ψ≥1 (X) =
∞∑
l=1
e−X
X l
l!
, (26)
and we have assumed that rd << 1 in the second line in eq.(25). The corresponding expres-
sion that arises in the case of a perfect source of single photon quantum bits is [29]
nSPS =
m
2
[
(1− rd) ηα + rd
]
≃ m
2
(ηα + rd) . (27)
As expected, we see that nSPS is independent of the quantity µ. The corresponding expres-
sions for the numbers of errors in the sifted strings generated by the two types of sources
are
eT,WCS ≃ m
2
[
ψ≥1 (ηµα) rc +
rd
2
]
, (28)
(rc is the intrinsic channel error fraction) and
eT,SPS ≃ m
2
(
ηαrc +
rd
2
)
. (29)
We recall that q and t are, respectively, the information leaked during error correction and
an upper bound for the amount of information Eve can obtain by direct measurement on
single photon pulses. Upon introducing the quantities Q and T through
q ≡ QeT , (30)
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and
t ≡ TeT , (31)
the expressions for the effective secrecy capacities for the two types of sources can be shown
to be given by [8, 23, 29]
SWCS ≡ n− eT − q − t− ν − gpa − a
m
∣∣∣
WCS
=
n− feT − ν − gpa − a
m
∣∣∣
WCS
=
1
2
[
ψ≥1 · (1− fWCSrc) +
(
1− fWCS
2
)
rd − ν˜
]
− gpa + a
m
, (32)
(here ψ≥1 ≡ ψ≥1 (ηµα) and ν˜ ≡ 2ν/m with the rescaled quantity ν˜ independent of m) and
SSPS ≡ n− eT − q − t− gpa − a
m
∣∣∣
SPS
=
n− feT − gpa − a
m
∣∣∣
SPS
=
1
2
[
ηα · (1− fSPSrc) +
(
1− fSPS
2
)
rd
]
− gpa + a
m
, (33)
where we have introduced
fWCS ≡ 1 +QWCS + TWCS (34)
and
fSPS ≡ 1 +QSPS + TSPS , (35)
with QSPS calculated solely as a function of nSPS and eT,SPS, and with QWCS calculated
solely as a function of nWCS and eT,WCS, respectively (and likewise for the calculation of
TWCS and TSPS). Detailed expressions for Q and T may be found in [8, 23, 29].
We now proceed to compare the use of a perfect single photon source with the use of a weak
coherent source. We also wish to consider two levels of technology available to the enemy,
one in which the enemy can surreptitiously effectively eliminate the intrinsic attenuation
along the quantum channel, which is usually to her advantage, and another in which this
is not possible for her to do. In the former case we may imagine two ways in which, at
least in principle, it could be possible for this to occur. In one situation, we may imagine
that the enemy somehow has the capability to remove the installed fiber optic cable and
replace it with a new cable that is effectively lossless, all without being detected “in the
act.” Of course, it is clear that this is an extremely unlikely situation, due both to the
near-impossibility of undetectably removing and replacing a long length of cable, and, even
moreso, the implausibility of being able to produce lossless cable at all. We will underscore
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this implausibility by referring to such a hypothetical lossless fiber optic cable as “magic”
cable. The other situation in which the enemy may effectively eliminate the attenuation
along the quantum channel arises if she has both an accomplice near Bob and access to prior
shared entanglement. In that case Eve and the accomplice located near Bob prepare pairs of
entangled photons in advance. Eve then entangles one of these pairs with a photon emitted
by Alice. Her accomplice can then make measurements on the entangled state, gaining
information about the photons at Eve’s location without losing photons to the attenuation
in the channel.
For the calculation of SWCS and RWCS we will need to use the correct expression for ν, the
function that specifies the amount of privacy amplification compression that is associated to
the presence of multi-photon pulses in the transmission from Alice to Bob. The appropriate
form for ν is determined by whether or not we presume that it is possible for Eve to effectively
eliminate the line attenuation along the quantum channel, as described above. As discussed
in detail in [8, 23], the correct expressions for ν that will ensure unconditional secrecy (in
the sense of privacy amplification) are given follows: If we presume that Eve can somehow
effectively eliminate the line attenuation along the quantum channel we have
νmax =
m
2
[
ψ≥2 (µ)− (1− y)−1 ·
{
e−yµ − e−µ
[
1 + µ (1− y)
]}]
, (36)
with the parameter y given by y = η, subject to the constraint y > 1− 1√
2
(
i.e., y >∼ 0.293
)
,
which is automatically satisfied in the examples we consider. If we presume that Eve cannot
effectively eliminate the line attenuation along the quantum channel we have
νmax =
m
2
[
ψ2 (µ) y + 1− e−µ
(√
2 sinh
µ√
2
+ 2 cosh
µ√
2
− 1
)]
, (37)
with the parameter y now given by y = ηα, subject to the constraint y < 1− 13√2
(
i.e., y <∼ 0.206
)
,
which is also automatically satisfied in the examples we consider.
In the scenarios that follow we consider fiber-optic cable implementations of quantum key
distribution making use of either good quality single-mode, polarization-preserving fiber
characterized by an intrinsic attenuation characteristic of A1 = 0.3 dB per kilometer, or of
high quality fiber characterized by A2 = 0.2 dB per kilometer. We take the photon detector
device efficiency to be η = 50%, and we assume that appropriate splicing and insertion of
suitable dispersion-compensating fiber segments, as discussed in [8], has been carried out
so as to mitigate the dispersion losses described and analyzed there. To account for the
associated splicing loss and other insertion losses we assume that the quantum channel is
characterized by a total bulk loss of κ = −5 dB, in addition to the losses associated with the
attenuation per unit length. Thus the transmission probability for the quantum channel is
given by
α = α (Lfiber, A, κ)
= 10−
ALfiber+κ
10 , (38)
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where Lfiber is the length of the fiber cable connecting Alice and Bob.
For all of our numerical examples we have taken a value for the Shannon deficit parameter x
of x = 1.16 (cf [8] for a discussion of x), which means that we are assuming that an efficient
method of error correction has been employed that approaches the Shannon limit to within
16%, and we use a raw bit processing block size of m = 200 Megabits. In addition, we
have also set all of the continuous authentication security parameter values, gi, as well as
the privacy amplification security parameter gpa, equal to 30, and we have employed a value
of ǫ = 10−9 for the selectable infinitesimal quantity that determines the success likelihood
for attacks on single-photon pulses, (this applies for both authentic single photon qubits
generated by a single photon source, and the single-photon part of the transmission stream
generated by a filtered, pulsed laser). We are also assuming the use of a photon detector
device that has a dark count rating of 10−6 counts per bit cell. In addition, we make the
further assumption that the intrinsic channel error rate due to pulse dispersion in the optical
fiber is no greater than 1%.
It is important to point out a distinguishing feature in the computations of the effective
secrecy capacities for the WCS and SPS cases. In calculating SWCS we want to determine
the value of µ that produces the maximum throughput, whereas in the calculation of SSPS
this issue doesn’t arise since each pulse carries precisely one photon. When we plot RWCS as
a function of position along the fiber-optic quantum channel we utilize this optimized value
of the mean photon number per pulse, µopt, and in particular we must do so for each point
along the path. This is because α (Lfiber, A, κ) is explicitly a function of Lfiber, the position
of Bob on the quantum channel (cf eq.(38)). As the effective secrecy capacity SWCS itself
depends on α, we must determine new values of µopt for each value of Lfiber by obtaining a
new solution of the optimization equation 0 = ∂µSWCS|µ=µopt . In contrast, RSPS and SSPS
have no µ-dependence at all.
5.2.1 Scenario One: Eavesdropper cannot eliminate line attenuation
In Figure 1 we plot three effective secrecy rate curves. In this example, we presume that
the enemy can neither (a) surreptitiously replace the installed cable with a different cable
(in particular this means that the enemy is presumed to be unable to surreptitiously replace
the installed cable with an effectively lossless, or “magic” cable), nor (b) make use of prior
shared entanglement as a resource for cryptanalytic attacks. This means that the enemy
cannot alter the actual value of the line attenuation that exists along the cable. In turn,
this means that [8] we should set the privacy amplification parameter y to y = ηα in the
multi-photon part of the privacy amplification function to be used in the calculation of SWCS
and RWCS. There is no analogous issue in the case of the calculation of SSPS and RSPS,
since there is no multi-photon term in the privacy amplification function in the case of a
single photon source. Thus, for the computation of SWCS and RWCS we make use of the
form of νmax given in eq.(37) above.
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Effective Quantum Cryptographic Throughput of Secret Vernam Cipher with Optical Fiber Quantum Channel
"Cascade" error correction : Shannon exceedence = 16%
Continuous authentication processing block size = 200 Mbits
η= 50%
rc= 1%
rd= 1×10− 6 counts/bit cell
fiber loss constant= 0.3 dB/km
bulk fiber loss= 5.0 dB
y = ηα < 0.206
SPS: τ− 1 = 1 MHz
WCS: τ− 1 = 1 MHz
SPS: τ− 1 = 5 KHz
Figure 1: Effective Rate Curves for Fiber-Optic Link without Surreptitious Cable Replace-
ment or use of Prior Shared Entanglement by Eve
The upper curve displays the effective secrecy rate that would arise with a perfect single
photon source operating at a pulse repetition frequency (PRF) of 1 MHz. The middle curve
gives the effective secrecy rate corresponding to the use of a weak coherent source, also
operating at a pulse repetition frequency of 1 MHz. In order to represent a more realistic
situation based on the current state of the art in perfect single photon generation, the lower
curve shows the rate that is obtained with the use of a perfect single photon source operating
at a pulse repetition frequency of 5 KHz. Assuming that we compare systems with equal
pulse repetition frequencies, there is a substantial gain realized with the use of a perfect single
photon source compared to the use of a weak coherent source. For instance, inspection of
the graph reveals that at a separation distance of Lfiber = 10 kilometers an effective secrecy
rate of about 9840 bits per second can be realized with the use of a weak coherent source
with a 1 MHz PRF. A perfect single photon source operating at a PRF of 1 MHz achieves
this same secrecy rate at a distance of about 27.5 kilometers. We may also compare rates
between the two systems at a fixed separation distance between Alice and Bob. For example,
at a separation distance of 10 kilometers, in going from a WCS system to a SPS system the
rate increases from 9840 bits per second to 32900 bits per second, a gain of about 5.2 dB.
Although on the scale of the graph in Figure 1 the curve for the SPS system operating at a
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Effective Quantum Cryptographic Throughput of Secret Vernam Cipher with Optical Fiber Quantum Channel
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Figure 2: Effective Rate Curves for Fiber-Optic Link without Surreptitious Cable Replace-
ment or use of Prior Shared Entanglement by Eve
PRF of 5 KHz appears to yield no throughput at all, inspection of Figure 2 reveals that this
is not the case. We note that, in spite of the substantial reduction in the amount of privacy
amplification compression that is realized upon going from a WCS system to a SPS system
(i.e., replacing νmax with 0), there is no location, up to a separation distance of 56 kilometers,
at which the 1 MHz WCS curve and 5 KHz SPS curve cross each other. Therefore, if we take
a putative 5 KHz SPS system as representative of what might be achieved in the near future,
we see that it is nevertheless advantageous to employ a 1 MHz WCS system compared to
the 5 KHz SPS system.
5.2.2 Scenario Two: Eavesdropper can eliminate line attenuation
In Figure 3 we consider a scenario in which the enemy is somehow able to effectively eliminate
the attenuation along the quantum channel, either by surreptitiously replacing the installed
cable with a “magic” cable that is lossless, or by employing prior shared entanglement
distributed between two operating locations adjacent to the Alice and Bob locations (but
somehow unobserved by Alice and Bob).
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Figure 3: Effective Rate Curves for Fiber-Optic Link with Surreptitious Cable Replacement
or use of Prior Shared Entanglement by Eve
As in Figure 1, the upper curve in Figure 3 displays the effective secrecy rate that would
arise with a perfect single photon source operating at a pulse repetition frequency of 1 MHz.
The middle curve gives the effective secrecy rate corresponding to the use of a weak coherent
source, also operating at a pulse repetition frequency of 1 MHz. The lower curve shows the
rate that would arise with the use of a perfect single photon source operating at a pulse
repetition frequency of 5 KHz. Assuming as before that we compare systems with equal
pulse repetition frequencies, we see that there is a substantial gain realized with the use of a
perfect single photon source compared to the use of a weak coherent source. Inspection of the
graph reveals that at a separation distance of Lfiber = 10 kilometers one obtains an effective
secrecy rate of about 2130 bits per second with the use of a weak coherent source operating
at a PRF of 1 MHz. A perfect single photon source also operating at a PRF of 1 MHz
achieves the same effective secrecy rate at a distance of about 50 kilometers, a substantial
increase. We may also compare rates between the two systems at a fixed separation distance
between Alice and Bob. For example, at a separation distance of 10 kilometers, upon going
from a WCS system to a SPS system the rate increases from 2130 bits per second to 30740
bits per second, a gain of about 11.6 dB.
As with the example given in Scenario One above, the scale employed in Figure 3 makes
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Figure 4: Effective Rate Curves for Fiber-Optic Link with Surreptitious Cable Replacement
or use of Prior Shared Entanglement by Eve
it difficult to directly compare the cases of a WCS source operating at a PRF of 1 MHz
and a SPS source operating at a PRF of 5 KHz. Inspection of Figure 4, however, reveals
an interesting feature that distinguishes Scenario Two from Scenario One. For separation
distances of less than 33 kilometers it is apparent that it is always preferable to employ a 1
MHz WCS source rather than a 5 KHz SPS source, as the throughput rate for the former is
always greater than that for the latter. However, the two throughput curves cross each other
at a separation distance of about 33 kilometers. Thus, for distances greater than about 33
kilometers we find that one obtains a better secrecy rate by using a SPS source instead of a
WCS source, even though in this case the PRF of the WCS source is 200 times larger than
the PRF of the SPS source.
5.2.3 Scenario Three: Comparison of Optical Fiber Quality
In Figure 5 we illustrate the effect of improving the intrinsic attentuation characteristic of
the optical fiber, demonstrated here for the case of a SPS source operating at a PRF of
5 KHz. The two curves in the graph are plotted for two different fiber-optic cables, with
intrinsic attenuation values of 0.2 dB per kilometer and 0.3 dB per kilometer, respectively,
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Figure 5: Effective throughput Rate Comparison for Single Photon Source with Fiber Cables
of Two Different Qualities
in the upper and lower curves.
Inspection of the graph reveals that, at a separation distance between Alice and Bob of
Lfiber = 10 kilometers, the fiber with the attenuation characteristic of 0.3 dB per kilometer
supports an effective secrecy rate of about 164 bits per second, while the fiber with the
attenuation characteristic of 0.2 dB per kilometer suports this throughput rate out to a
separation distance of 15 kilometers. We also note that at a separation distance of 25
kilometers, the lower quality fiber supports an effective secrecy rate of about 57.9 bits per
second, while the higher quality fiber supports an effective secrecy rate of about 103.6 bits
per second, corresponding to a gain of about 2.5 dB.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have discussed several features of the practical implementation of quantum
cryptography in real environments having to do with unconditional secrecy, computational
loads and effective secrecy rates in the presence of perfect and imperfect sources. As progress
in telecommunications and optoelectronics continues to make the insertion of quantum cryp-
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tographic technology into real communications systems a more realistic prospect it will be-
come increasingly important to uncover further details and subtleties that determine the
optimum possible performance characteristics.
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